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PUBLIC CHOICE REVISITED 
Daniel A. Farber* 
and 
Philip P. Frickey** 
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY. 
By Maxwell L. Steams. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. 1997. 
Pp. xxxvii, 1035. $54.95. 
Although not the first book on public choice_ for a legal audi­
ence,1 Max Stearns's Public Choice and Public Law2 is the first full­
scale textbook for law school use.3 An ambitious undertaking by a 
rising young scholar, the book provides law students with a compre­
hensive introduction to public choice. _ 
Public choice - essentially, the application of economic reason­
ing to political institutions - has become a significant aspect of 
public law scholarship. Indeed, in his Foreword, Saul Levmore 
hails public choice as "[t]he most exciting intellectual development 
in law schools in the last decade" (p. xi). Be that as it may, the 
publication of the first textbook surely marks an important stage in 
the development of a subject. It is an apt occasion to evaluate the 
ways in which public choice can best contribute to legal education 
and scholarship. 
Our goal in this review, consequently, is not merely to assess the 
Stearns book, but to see what light it sheds on this broader ques­
tion. In Part I of the review, we accompany Steams on a tour of 
public choice and public law. The book provides a good cross sec­
tion of the major writings of legal scholars interested in public 
choice. For readers familiar with the field, Part I provides an op-
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Minnesota. 
B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Illinois. - Ed. We received useful comments from partici­
pants at the Harvard Law and Economics Workshop. 
** Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, Kansas; J.D. 
1978, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAos, AND GOVERNANCE: UsING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW 
AND PuBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL lNrnoDUCTION (1991). 
2. Maxwell Stearns is an Associate Professor at the George Mason University School of 
Law. 
3. A briefer treatment of public choice, suitable for use as a supplement but not for a 
complete course, is DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1992). Besides its brevity, this work differs from the 
Stearns book in that it takes the form of a traditional casebook, with its discussion of public 
choice mostly added in the form of textual notes. 
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portunity to examine Stearns's organization and choice of readings. 
For others, it provides a primer on the topic. Building on Stearns's 
materials in Part II, we offer some thoughts about how public 
choice can best inform legal scholarship. A similar debate about 
the utility of public choice has been raging in political science,4 and 
we believe that this debate has generated some useful insights 
about the possible contributions of public choice to understanding 
legal issues. Indeed, some of the leading public choice scholars in 
political science have now revamped their claims for the theory as a 
result of this debate.5 Legal academics such as Stearns have not yet 
had time to absorb these developments and thus may be asking 
more from public choice theory than its best practitioners believe it 
can realistically offer. Fmally, in Part III, we consider how public 
choice can contribute to the education of law students. One of the 
questions raised in Levmore's Foreword is the extent to which pub­
lic choice should be integrated into existing courses, as opposed to 
receiving a separate place in the curriculum (pp. xiv-xv). Our own 
view, unlike Levmore's, is that public choice is likely to be most 
useful when integrated into existing courses, but that materials like 
Stearns's can serve a beneficial function for more advanced 
students. 
I. PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: A GUIDED TOUR 
Instead of using a casebook format, Public Choice and Public 
Law offers a series of lengthy excerpts from scholarly articles, al­
most all from law reviews, followed by extensive notes and explana­
tory text by the author. Unlike the snippets of articles that most 
law-school casebooks offer, the substantial portions of original 
works provided by Stearns give authors a fair chance to elaborate 
their views in their own words. Stearns's notes explore the readings 
in detail, with citations to a broad segment of the scholarly litera­
ture. 6 By following Stearns through his tour of public choice, we 
can get a good sense of the current state of legal scholarship in the 
field. 
4. See THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF PoLmcs RECON· 
SIDERED ( Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY]; 
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A Cm. 
TIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN PoLmCAL SCIENCE (1994). "Rational choice" is a somewhat 
more comprehensive term that includes both public choice and game theory. 
5. See text accompanying notes 55·67 infra. 
6. Not the least of the book's virtues is the 25·page bibliography, which should be invalu· 
able to students and scholars who want to explore the literature more deeply. Pp. 977·1002. 
The bibliography cites approximately 600 works, though some concern jurisprudence or con· 
stitutional theory rather than public choice. Another very useful source for legal scholars is 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK (Dennis c. Mueller ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
PERSPECTIVES ON PuBLIC CHOICE). 
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The book is divided into three segments: Chapter One in­
troduces the use of rational choice models of political institutions; 
Chapter Two covers social choice theory deriving from Arrow's 
Theorem; and Chapter Three surveys selected applications to public 
law. We follow that organization in this section. 
A. Rational Choice Models . 
As Stearns points out in his Preface, public choice is not a mon­
olithic field (pp. xvii-xviii). It derives from three different academic 
movements, each with a separate home base: the Chicago School, 
which emphasized the tendency for the regulatory process to be co­
opted by special interests; the Rochester school, which stressed "the 
arbitrariness and unpredictability of governmental outcomes, at 
least if the preferences of the legislators or their constituents are 
employed as a baseline"; and the Virginia School, which studied 
how constitutional frameworks could shape the future development 
of public policy (pp. xviii-xix). Further, some public choice models 
are based on standard microeconomics, while others are based on 
game theory or on the work of Kenneth Arrow and his followers 
(pp. xix-xx). Not surprisingly given the field's complex origins, 
even its name is unsettled: public choice, social choice, rational 
choice, and positive political theory have each been favored at one 
time or another by various authors.7 
What holds this diverse movement together is a common meth­
odology based on the concept of rational decisionmaking: simply 
put, political actors, like economic ones, make rational decisions 
designed to maximize the achievement of their preferences. This 
maximization assumption makes it possible to use mathematical 
techniques of various kinds, many of them borrowed from econom­
ics, to model political behavior. Less formally, it allows the applica­
tion of economic insights to political behavior. These economic 
insights can result in powerful conclusions about the political 
system. 
One such economic insight concerns the possibility of free rid­
ing. A rational person would avoid investing in the production of a 
benefit if virtually the same benefit could be enjoyed without the 
investment. This simple point has manifold implications in eco­
nomics, ranging from the instability of cartels - because individual 
members of the cartel have an incentive to cheat - to the inade­
quate market supply for public goods such as clean air - because 
individuals prefer to enjoy the clean air without having to pay for 
the pollution control equipment. It also has a powerful analogy in 
7. Cf. Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 
80 GEo. LJ. 457, 458-60 (199 2). Often, an author using a particular term would attribute 
slightly different connotations to the other terms on the list. 
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politics, first pointed out by Mancur Olson.8 A legislative enact­
ment may benefit everyone in a group, perhaps everyone in the 
country, but each can enjoy a statute's benefits without having con­
tributed to the lobbying effort. Hence, there is a temptation to free 
ride and let other people pay the price to pass the new legislation. 
As it turns out, the free-riding problem is inversely related to the 
size of the group - for example, when the issue is air pollution, it is 
much easier to mobilize a handful of car companies than the urban 
population. (Group size is crucial for two reasons: (1) given the 
same total benefit to the group, size is inversely related to the mag­
nitude of any individual's stake; and (2) size increases transaction 
costs.) The result is a skew in politics giving greater influence to 
special interests - relatively concentrated groups with high individ­
ual stakes - than to the diffuse interests of taxpayers, consumers, 
and citizens generally. Given two groups with roughly equal but 
opposing interests, the smaller group has an innate advantage. 
The key to this argument is that political actors behave ration­
ally in the sense that they maximize their expected personal wel­
fare, taking into account both the costs and benefits of political 
activities. Clearly, there are possible alternatives to this view: peo­
ple may attempt to optimize outcomes but suffer from systematic 
cognitive defects; their conflicting, incoherent, or unstable goals 
may make optimizing impossible; strong emotional currents may 
render them incapable of thinking rationally about consequences; 
or they may behave rationally in some noninstrumentalist sense -
for example, by following a Kantian ethical edict. Notwithstanding 
these potential alternatives, public choice theory rests on the prem­
ise that instrumental rationality is an effective basis for predicting 
political behavior, if not an entirely realistic psychological model. 
Given its centrality to public choice, the rationality assumption 
clearly warrants careful examination, and Stearns begins Chapter 
One with a group of articles debating its validity. At one extreme, 
Judge Abner Mikva rejects the premise of self-interested welfare 
maximization in politics, remarking that even in the notoriously ve­
nal Illinois legislature he had found examples of public-regarding 
conduct.9 At the other extreme, Michael DeBow and Dwight Lee 
provide a thoughtful defense of the assumption that "people will 
allocate their limited means . . .  to maximize their personal satisfac­
tion. "10 In the middle, the book includes excerpts from our own 
8. P. 16 (discussing MANcuR OLSON, THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE ACTioN: Punuc 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) ). 
9. See p. 38 (excerpting Abner Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Fore· 
word, 14 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988 ) ). 
10. P. 45 (excerpting Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 993 (1988 ) ). 
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work, arguing that both ideology and self-interest play a role in the 
political system.11 
Voting provides one of the greatest challenges to the rationality 
assumption. It is not clear that voting can be usefully explained as 
an effort to maximize the achievement of some goal. Recall that 
the temptation to free ride increases with the size of the group, and 
here the group consists of the entire electorate. An individual vote 
has almost no chance of influencing a national election. Indeed, it 
would hardly be worth the trouble of standing in a voting line on 
the minuscule chance of casting the single decisive vote in a Presi­
dential election! Of course, it is possible that people simply like to 
vote, that voting is a form of personal consumption, with pulling the 
lever in the voting booth playing much the same role as jiggling the 
joystick in a vid�o game. But this explanation seems distinctly un­
helpful: it does little more than pronounce that people vote be­
cause it is something they want to do. 
Steams discusses several possible methods of saving the "con­
sumption" explanation from tautology. One possibility is that peo­
ple vote on the gamble that other people will choose to stay home, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that they" will cast the decisive 
vote. On the other hand, individuals may vote as a signal to others 
that there is no point in playing this cat-and-mouse game, thus en­
couraging people with contrary political views to stay home. Or, 
perhaps people pursue extremely risk-averse strategies or are mis­
led into thinking that their votes count (pp. 67-69). In any event, 
Steams himself questions whether the "voting paradox" is really 
important: 
We might all agree that from the perspective of instrumental rational­
ity, voting lies at the outer edge of human conduct. But so what? 
Whatever the reasons for popular voting, the fact is that many people 
vote . .  More importantly, most activities in which people engage, in­
cluding those that are the subject of public choice, can be explained 
with models that are premised upon more intuitive understandings -
and manifestations - of rationality. [p. 69] 
In particular, Steams argues, even if we cannot model voters, we 
can model the behavior of elected officials on the assumption that 
their sole goal is reelection. His rationale is that politicians who fail 
to follow the model "quickly move off the radar of political ana­
lysts, and of public choice scholars, if their principles prevent an 
electoral victory'" (pp. 71-72). Hence, ."[i]f those candidates who 
are elected behave as if they are primarily motivated by the desire 
to be re-elected (regardless of their actual and initial motivations), 
11. Pp. 5-35 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pub­
lic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873 {1987 ) ); pp. 58-6 2 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEXAS L. 
REv. 1013 (1988 ) ). 
1720 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1715 
public choice modeling built upon the electoral goal postulate is 
likely to remain robust."12 
The voter's paradox is not necessarily a fatal flaw in public 
choice theory, but as we see in Part III of this review, it has received 
considerable attention from political scientists, and for good reason. 
Voter behavior is only a subset of public political conduct, which 
includes making campaign contributions, joining interest groups, 
and monitoring political affairs. If we cannot predict voting, it is 
not clear that we can expect to do much .better in predicting these 
other forms of behavior, and thus we leave many of the inputs into 
the political process as unexplained "black boxes." Moreover, if we 
cannot explain why people vote at all, we have no reason to think 
we can account for how they vote. At best, we are left with a par':" 
tial explanation of the overall political process. Furthermore, we 
may not be able to rely entirely on natural selection among politi­
cians to ensure that only the most reelection-oriented survive. De­
pending on people's motivations for entering politics, at any given 
time the political process might contain a large number of short­
term players who nevertheless hold considerable political power.13 
More fundamentally, if we have no workable model of political in­
puts, the assumption that politicians try to maximize their chances 
of reelection has limited predictive value. 
As Stearns observes at the end of his discussion of the voting 
paradox, the, voting-paradox debate raises a more general issue 
about empirical validation: "[I]t may well be harder than it first 
appears to test public choice modeling empirically" (p. 72). If the 
assumptions of public choice theory are not completely realistic, 
and if it does not generate testable empirical predictions, just what 
claim does it have to validity? This partial disconnect between 
modeling and empirical data raises important methodological is­
sues, to which we will return in Part II. In any event, whether this 
disconnect is a serious flaw depends in large part on what we expect 
public choice theory to accomplish. 
For the moment, however, we can put aside the voter's paradox 
and indulge the assumption that politicians, at least, are instrumen­
tally rational. Let us also put aside the question of empirical valida­
tion and simply ask whether public choice theory has anything 
1 2. P. 7 2. On the same theory, presumably, one might counsel hospital administrators to 
act on the assumption that all patients are long-term residents of the hospital, because short­
timers will "quickly move off the radar." 
13. Indeed, the current move toward term limits markedly increases the likelihood of this 
outcome. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 
CORNELL L. REv. 6 23, 647-48 (1996 ). One can even imagine a process of reverse selection, in 
which voters favor politicians whose past records suggest that they are willing to take princi­
pled but seemingly inexpedient stands, so that politicians might take risky, unpopular stands, 
gambling on achieving a higher office but increasing the risk of losing their current positions. 
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interesting to say about issues of public law. The book's next batch 
of material will reassure the student who has such concerns. 
Stearns closes the first chapter with three case studies that help il­
lustrate the theory's utility: the line-item veto, the nondelegation 
doctrine, and the scope of judicial review. The discussion of the 
line-item veto is illustrative and confirms that public choice can pro­
vide intriguing insights. 
Glen Robinson's article about the line-item veto14 makes an ef­
fective analogy to economic bargaining models. Robinson points 
out that the President and Congress are in a position of bilateral 
monopoly. The President cannot obtain legislation without Con­
gress, but given the difficulty of overriding vetoes, as a practical 
matter Congress needs the President's consent to obtain what it 
wants (p. 103). As Robinson observes, economists have studied bi­
lateral monopolies extensively, but their predictions are cloudy (p. 
105). After considering some of the strategic possibilities open to 
both players, Robinson argues that "the effects of an item veto au­
thority are more complex than they have been made out to be" (p. 
107). He concludes that "[t]he complexities confound any simple 
predictions about effects; probably the most reliable prediction 
would be that the item veto would be only marginally useful in cur­
tailing private goods legislation" (p. 107). 
The other excerpt about the line-item veto, written by Stearns 
himself,15 takes the strategic analysis a step further. Robinson's 
model implicitly assumes that only a single piece of public-interest 
legislation is on the table at any given time. Legislators must either 
attach their riders to this one bill or present them as separate enact­
ments. But, as Stearns points out, multiple public-interest propos­
als actually are pending simultaneously, so legislators have a choice 
about which proposal to use as a vehicle (p. 97). By threatening to 
use the line-item veto if legislators attach riders to anything but his 
favored bill, the President can extract support for his bill as the 
price of obtaining passage of the rider. The end result is the pas­
sage of the same amount of special-interest legislation despite the 
line-item veto, but the President has much greater leverage over 
general legislation vis-a-vis Congress (p. 98). The strategic process 
could be more complicated still: for example, if the President re­
gards the riders as too costly, he might tend to favor bills that re­
quire little leverage of this kind, leading him back in the direction 
of the general legislation favored by Congress. 
· 
14. Pp. 101-09 (excerpting Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item 
Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 403 (1988 ) ), 
15. Pp. 77-100 (excerpting Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item 
Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385 (199 2 ) ). 
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The reader may or inay not have confidence in the ability of 
public choice theory to predict the effects of the line item veto. But 
pl.J.blic choice does illuminate the complexity of predicting the ef­
fects of even the simplest procedural or institutional changes.16 If 
nothing else, public choice reveals the assumption that the line item 
veto will reduce pork-baµ-el legislation as highly simplistic. 
B. Arrow's Theorem 
Chapter 1\vo is devoted to . Arrow's Theorem and its possible 
implications for political institutions. Some background on Arrow's 
Theorem may be useful before turning to Stearns's treatment of the 
subject. Arrow was interested in the measurement of social wel­
fare. Essentially, he asked whether, given only individual rankings 
of outcomes, it is possible to derive a ranking of those outcomes for 
society as a whole. Arrow placed very modest restrictions on the 
ranking technique. Beyond some technical requirements necessary 
to set up the problem, he added only two requirements for a tech­
nique to qualify as a ·  social welfare measure. First, the technique 
had to be nondictatorial. ObVi.ously, it would be easy to construct a 
ranking of societal preferences by simply picking a dictator and 
adopting that person's ranking. Whatever one might think of this 
as a form of government, it clearly does not qualify as a measure of 
social welfare. Hence, Arrow required that no one person's prefer­
ences be decisive. This minimal form of egalitarianism, however, is 
not enough to connect the resulting social-preference ranking with 
social welfare. To provide such a link, Arrow also requir�d that the 
technique· satisfy the Pareto standard. That is, if at least one person 
in society prefers outcome 1 over outcome 2, and no one else has 
the opposite preference, then society as a whole prefers outcome 1. 
Again, this is a very weak requirement - it says nothing about 
what happens when 240 million people prefer outcome 1 and only 
one person prefers outcome 2. 
Arrow's specifications thus amount to the barest possible quali­
fications for a social welfare function. Quite remarkably, however, 
he proved that no method of combining individual preferences can 
satisfy these two qualifications along with the technical require­
ments.17 The technical requirements themselves are seemingly 
modest. Arrow's technical requirements are as follows: 
16. As actually implemented, the "line item veto" turns out to be anything but simple 
(and in fact is far from being ,a true line item veto ). For a discussion of the complexities of 
the current statutory scheme, see Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Fed­
eral Budget Process and the Line Item Veto (applying public choice to project some possible 
consequences ) (forthcoming ). 
17. For a fuller discussion of Arrow's theorem, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 
II 384-99 (1989). 
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Minimum Rationality. If society prefers outcome A to outcome B, 
and outcome B to outcome C, then society prefers A over C. 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If C is not on the agenda, 
whether A is preferred to B should not depend on ·how either one 
compares with C. This is really a disguised guarantee that outcomes 
are based solely on how alternatives are ranked, rather than on how 
intensely they �re desired. 
Universal Applicability. The method has to work - that is, produce a 
definite outcome - for any possibl�. combination of preferences, not 
just particular distributions of preferences aw�ng the group. 
Arrow was also interested in voting, and his theorem has impor­
tant implications regarding voting mechanisms. Voting, like social 
welfare measurements, may be considered a way of determining the 
"public interest," and at the very least, it ranks alternatives based 
on how they fare in an election. The immediate consequence of 
Arrow's Theorem is that voting mechanisms must fail at least one 
of Arrow's criteria. In most voting situations,' the sticking point is 
minimum rationality. It turns out that even in very simple situa­
tions it is possible for the electorate to choose outcome A over out­
come B, and outcome B over C - but for outcome C to beat 
outcome A (p. xii). 
This cycling of outcomes raises some obvious questions about 
democratic institutions. For example, is majority rule too capri­
cious to deserve the central role it has sometimes played in political 
theory? Putting aside this normative question, we also find puzzles 
about the actual behavior of legislatures. Specifically, because leg­
islatures rarely exhibit cycling, we may wonder how legislatures are 
able to produce stable outcomes. This inq¢ry tends to lead toward 
the sophisticated use of game theory.18 · • 
For political scientists, Arrow's Theorem is only the starting 
point in an attempt to model legislatures; Presumably, well-tested 
models of the legislattire would be useful in considering public law 
issues, but Steams does not explore the efforts of political scientists 
to provide such models. Indeed, at one point he goes so far as to 
warn the reader to "[b ]eware the 'sophisticated' model" (p. 718). 
Rather than exploring these more sophisticated models by political 
scientists, Steams excerpts two law review articles on social choice 
models of legislative voting. The first, by Saul Levmore, explores 
the question of why legislatures generally follow certain decision­
making procedures, such as a sequence of motions and amend­
ments.19 Levmore proposes that, where cycling does not exist, 
legislative rules are designed to identify the "true" winner - called 
18. For a survey of some later efforts, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 47-51. 
19. Pp. 258-94 (excerpting Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, 
and the Voting Paradox, 15 VA. L. REv. 971 (1989 ) ). 
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the Condorcet winner for historical reasons. Other times, legisla­
tive rules are designed largely to paper over the possibility of cy­
cling. Specifically, Levmore suggests that legislative procedures 
may have evolved through applying the following guidelines: 
(1) employ the motion-and-amendment process when there are few 
alternatives because it promises to find any Condorcet choice without 
encouraging unavoidable dissatisfaction; (2) when there are numerous 
alternatives likely to be proposed, facilitate a switch to succession vot­
ing because a Condorcet winner is quite unlikely and the switch will 
make it difficult for the chair to manipulate the order of recognition 
to unfairly influence the outcome; and (3) when succession voting ex­
poses unavoidable dissatisfaction, tinker with the order in which pro­
posals are considered.20 
Levmore concludes that he has "produced . . .  a strong positive the­
ory which explains a remarkable number of decisionmaking rules. 
"Moreover," he adds, the theory is "accompanied by an evolution­
ary theory, built around the idea of dissatisfied majority coalitions, 
which explains how things came to be as they are" (p. 294). 
Although intriguing, Levmore's speculations have the disadvan­
tage of being unprovable, as we know nothing about the history of 
core parliamentary rules (pp. 259-62). Although, as Levmore says, 
"it is easy to imagine" (p. 270) that something like his evolutionary 
mechanism operated, we really have no way of knowing, particu­
larly since Levmore does not give much thought to alternative ex­
planations. But more important, in terms of its usefulness for 
teaching purposes, Levmore's hypothesis is disassociated from any 
larger research agenda about legislative structure or procedure of 
the kind developed by political scientists. In particular, most polit­
ical scientists consider Condorcet winners quite rare; indeed, one 
theorem shows under plausible assumptions that no Condorcet win­
ner exists if the issue space is multidimensional.21 Nor is it easy to 
see why the rules should be designed primarily to produce Condor­
cet winners if one by chance exists, because almost any set of rules 
will do so if legislators are sophisticated and vote strategically (p. 
282 n.136). 
20. P. 285. Succession voting, mentioned in guideline 2, is a fill-in-the-blank process in 
which proposals are considered in a preset order - for example, dates from earlier to later. 
Pp. 272-76. The Condorcet winner beats every other alternative in pair-wise voting. It is thus 
the "top" choice. 
21. This result is known as the chaos theorem, because it seems to imply that all outcomes 
cycle, leaving the legislature with no stability. See PETER C. 0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY 
AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 76-82 (1986). Much effort has been devoted to 
explaining why this instability does not obtain in reality. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 
1, at 48-57; Peter Ordeshook, The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four De­
cades of Research, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 6, at 250-56. 
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Building on Levmore's theory, Stearns moves on to an excerpt 
from one of his own articles.22 Stearns undertakes to compare the 
voting procedures used in legislatures and courts with respect to 
Arrow's criteria, with the aim of clarifying the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of these institutions (p. 305). The hypothesis is that 
courts use different voting rules than legislatures because courts are 
sacrificing different items out of Arrow's list of criteria.23 The legis­
lature is designed - a la Levmore (p. 323) - to seek a Condorcet 
winner when one exists, but legislatures give up on the decisiveness 
criteria, which means that often the legislature will produce no ac­
tion whatsoever. Steams asserts that because courts must always 
decide cases (p. 329), they sacrifice the possibility of finding the 
Condorcet winner (pp. 329-38). More generally, the Arrovian "re­
quirement of rationality in Supreme Court decisionmaking is 
subordinated to the requirement that the Court decide all cases 
before it" (p. 348). 
This theory may somewhat outstrip the evidence. The notion 
that the mandate to decide every case can explain basic features of 
the judicial system seems a bit like the tail wagging the dog. It has 
the additional disadvantage that the tail is flawed, inasmuch as the 
Supreme Court is not in fact subject to any formal requirement to 
make an affirmative decision in every case.24 On the contrary, the 
decision rule is the same as that of the legislature: the status quo -
in the form of the lower court judgment - stands unless a majority 
of Justices votes to change the result; thus the occasional notation 
of cases "affirmed by an equally divided Court." Alternatively, 
when, for whatever reason, no majority exists to decide a case, it 
can be reset for argument the following Term, in theory a process 
that could continue indefinitely. (The Court also has the option of 
remanding for consideration in light of a completely inscrutable 
opinion, which has the same practical effect as making no decision 
at all.) Of course, if the Court frequently failed to issue any deci­
sion at all, it would be subject to grave criticism. But this is not 
necessarily different from Congress, whose failure to pass an appro­
priations bill can shut down the government and cause considerable 
consternation. So, the distinction between courts and legislatures 
regarding the decisiveness criteria is less stark than Stearns 
suggests. 
Our point is not that the Levmore and Steams arguments have 
possible flaws, but rather that their speculations about institutional 
22. Pp. 295-354 (excerpting Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 YALE LJ. 1219 (1994)). 
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
24. Like Stearns, we are putting aside the cases where the Court simply fails to grant 
certiorari. P. 329 n.156. 
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processes, while intriguing, may be too idiosyncratic to introduce 
students effectively to the subject. The book provides a somewhat 
broader look, however, as it moves on to consider some institu­
tional implications of public choice. Here, the selections include: 
an effort by Levmore to explain bicameralism, also based on the 
pivotal importance of Condorcet winners;25 a well-known essay by 
political scientist Ken Shepsle describing "legislative intent as an 
oxymoron" on the ground that Arrow's Theorem eliminates the 
concept of a coherent set of legislative . preferences;26 and two pa­
pers about the possibility of cycling in Supreme Court decisions 
presenting multiple issues.27 These papers do provide students a 
somewhat broader exposure to social choice theory.2s 
C. Applications to Law 
The final section of the book, Chapter Three, considers applica­
tions of public choice to a broad range of issues, ranging from the 
doctrine of stare decisis to antidiscrimination law. Most of the se­
lections cover one of three general areas: the functioning of the 
judiciary, the concept of legislative intent, and constitutional issues. 
The first two areas are not our focus in this review. Research on 
the judiciary is somewhat peripheral to the main body of public 
choice scholarship - though by no means unimportant - and . the 
two of us have already written more than enough about the subject 
of legislative intent, some of it reprinted in the book (pp. 641-70). 
Consequently, we will concentrate here on the constitutional area, 
which probably holds the greatest interest for most readers. Be­
cause the book includes excerpts on such a broad range of constitu­
tional topics, it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive yet 
coherent description. Instead, we will focus on two areas of partic­
ular interest relating to the structure of government: federalism 
and term limits. 
25. P. 386 (excerpting Saul Levmore, Bicamer�lism: When Are Two Decisions Better than 
One?, 12 lNrL. REv. L. & EcoN. 145 (1992)). 
26. Pp. 393-408 (excerpting Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an "It": Leg· 
is/ative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992)). 
27. Pp. 418-64 (excerpting Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. 
L. REv. 802 (1982) and Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 
YALE LJ. 82 (1986)). ' 
28. Although each of these papers is individually interesting, it would probably be more 
useful to give students a coherent picture of the ciirrent state of thought among public choice 
theorists about institutional structures and procedures, rather than a handful of papers deal­
ing with isolated problems. The extensive attention given to the procedures used by courts, 
here and elsewhere in the book (pp. 477-551, 724-876), is probably a tribute to the continued 
fascination that we in the legal academy have with the judiciary, while the public choice 
literature as a whole pays more attention to legislatures-and, secondarily, to popular 
elections. 
May 1998] Public Choice 1727 
The topic of federalism is represented by an article by Jon 
Macey about federal deference to local regulators.29 For example, 
Congress allows Delaware law to govern the internal affairs of most 
major corporations (p. 878 n.11). Macey asks why federal legisla­
tors would ever allow states to regulate, rather than exercising their 
power to preempt. After all, preemption would allow federal legis­
lators to capture all of the political gains to be obtained from legis­
lating on a topic (p. 878). In short, it would appear, "deference to 
state regulators simply allows local lawmakers to capture for them­
selves the political support available for supplying regulation to 
rent-seeking constituents" (p. 880). Macey's theory is that "Con­
gress will delegate to local regulators only when the political sup­
port it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the 
political support it obtains from regulating itself'' (p. 878). Like a 
business franchiser, Congress sometimes finds it more profitable to 
subcontract rather than vertically integrating and taking over the 
field. Macey suggests that this will be true when: (1) a particular 
state like Delaware "has developed a body of regulation that com­
prises a valuable capital asset"; (2) the most politically appealing 
alternative varies sharply on a geographic basis; or (3) "Congress 
can avoid potentially damaging political opposition from special­
interest groups by putting the responsibility for a particularly con­
troversial issue on state and local governments" (p. 879). Under all 
other circumstances, however, "obtaining a federal law will be the 
strategy of choice for most interest groups seeking to obtain wealth 
transfers" (p. 880). In particular, "interest groups will favor federal 
law over state law because states face stiffer competition from one 
another than the federal government faces from other sovereign na­
tions" (p. 882). 
In sum, Macey maintains: 
From a public-choice perspective, the federalist system can only 
be viewed as a mechanism that provides a complement rather than a 
substitute for federal law as a mechanism by which interest groups 
can exchange political support for wealth transfers. Deferring regula­
tory matters to the state legislatures must take its place alongside the 
other strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers 
to interest groups in exchange for political support. [p. 894] 
Or, as Stearns plits it, "[i]n Macey's analysis, federalism is not a 
doctrine with independent political content, but is instead a handy 
label politicians attach to outcomes that they have reached for quite 
independent reasons" (p. 895). 
29. Pp. 877-94 (excerpting Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and 
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 16 
VA. L. REv. 265 (1990)). 
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Federalism is an increasingly important area, both in constitu­
tional law30 and public choice scholarship,31 and Stearns is to be 
commended for including it in his coverage. The Macey article, 
however, gives only a partial view of this developing body of litera­
ture. While Macey's Chicago School perspective gives little weight 
to institutional factors, much current research is dedicated to ex­
ploring the institutional supports for federalism, including the struc­
ture of American political parties, competition between states to 
offer the optimal package of regulations, taxes, and services, the 
influence of state governments as federal lobbyists, and the role of 
the judiciary as enforcers of the federalist bargain.32 Perhaps a 
fuller coverage of these institutional issues will be warranted in 
later editions. 
Stearns does address one question of institutional design - the 
issue of term limits. Will term limits affect the behavior of legisla­
tors, and if so, will it make them more or less inclined to follow the 
lead of special interests? Linda Cohen and Matt Spitzer address 
this topic through game theory.33 Unlike many selections in the 
book, their paper offers a classic example of public choice research; 
although lacking in mathematics, it gives students the genuine feel 
of typical work by public choice theorists. Cohen and Spitzer care­
fully specify their models, explicitly discuss each significant assump­
tion, and then trace the logical implications of each model. 
Although they provide variants, there are essentially two basic 
models. 
The first model explores the tendency of politicians to favor 
projects with short-term benefits over long-term projects with 
greater public benefits (pp. 930-39). The key assumption, which 
Cohen and Spitzer support with some empirical evidence, is that 
politicians primarily seek reelection and that voters primarily assess 
candidates based on a candidate's past performance rather than 
predictions about the future. In other words, voters engage in ret­
rospective voting. Given these assumptions, politicians devalue 
long-term projects for two reasons. Most obviously, benefits that 
accrue after the politician leaves office provide him with no payoff. 
Less obviously, the payoff from winning any one election is partly 
the chance to run as an incumbent in later elections. The value of 
this payoff, of course, depends on the number of potential future 
elections a politician has left to win at any given time. For example, 
30. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
31. See, e.g., Symposium, The Law and Economics of Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 249 
(1997). 
32. These issues are discussed in the contributions to the Minnesota symposium, id. 
33. Pp. 925-60 (excerpting Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 
1992)). 
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a project whose benefit accrues in a politician's last term before 
retiring provides no reelection payoff at all and is therefore politi­
cally worthless to him. The upshot is that politicians discount fu­
ture benefits too heavily. Cohen and Spitzer go on to show that 
term limits accentuate this effect - more benefits take place after 
the politician has left office or when there are relatively few future 
elections left to be won (pp. 936-39). 
The second Cohen and Spitzer model illustrates an important 
game theory concept known as unraveling (pp. 937-38). In its 
baldest form, the problem is this. Suppose a legislator can only 
serve for three terms. After his second reelection, the legislator no 
longer faces the possibility of losing an election and therefore has 
no reason to care about the opinion of the electorate. Instead, she 
will cater to special interests who can provide her with benefits af­
ter she leaves office. The electorate will respond by refusing to re­
elect her a second time. The politician thus knows that her first 
reelection campaign will be her last, so her second term will be free 
from any electoral discipline. The electorate will respond by refus­
ing to reelect even once, so we are left with a one-term legislature, 
during which every legislator is a lame duck who is free from any 
responsibility to the electorate and devotes himself to serving spe-
cial interests. 
· 
Of course, this model is greatly. oversimplified, and Cohen and 
Spitzer relax their assumptions to consider more realistic scenarios. 
Nevertheless, they find, the general conclusion remains intact: 
"Other things being equal, term limits should induce legislators to 
spend more time servicing special interests and personal interests 
than they do at present" (p. 951). 
Unlike some public choice scholars, Cohen and Spitzer are cau­
tious in drawing normative conclusions. As they point out, they de:­
fine a special interest as "any minority of the constituency that 
would not be served in a world of fµll information" (p. 958). Thus, 
serving a special interest could include both "taking money for ter­
minating fraud investigation" and "standing up for what is 'right' " 
(p. 958). Cohen and Spitzer predict "more looting and graft, mixed 
with an increased nuniber of principled stands against the elector­
ate" (p. 959). Their concerns under the first model are less ambigu­
ous, because they feel strongly that legislators are already too 
present-minded (p. 959). 
The Cohen and Spitzer models are hardly bulletproof. Their as­
sumptions have some empirical support but are subject to dispute. 
Moreover, it is possible that term limits would change the rules of 
the political game enough to undermine their assumptions even if 
they are now valid - for example, voters might switch away from 
the retrospective voting that Cohen and Spitzer's first model as-
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sumes. Or, as Cohen and Spitzer admit, other structural changes 
such as strengthening of legislative ethics rules might counter some 
of their projections (pp. 944-45). As Stearns points out, responsive­
ness to district electorates may also lend itself to pork barrel legisla­
tion, which term limits might usefully diminish (pp. 963-64). But 
despite these and other possible replies to their argument,34 the 
Cohen and Spitzer paper is an excellent example of how public 
choice theory can help us think through the complex consequences 
of institutional changes. 
II. PUBLIC CHOICE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Under any but the most formalist view of legal analysis, an im­
proved understanding of how government works can aid public law 
scholarship. The question is whether - and how - public choice 
can contribute to that understanding. In addressing this question, 
we begin by examining a recent heated controversy about the ex­
planatory power of public choice among political scientists. Unlike 
many such debates, this one generated as much light as heat. Based 
on some of the insights generated by this debate, we then use some 
recent important work by legal scholars to illustrate how, in our 
opinion, public choice can best be integrated into legal scholarship. 
A. The "Pathologies" Debate and the Limits of Theory 
The debate opened in 1994 with the publication of Donald 
Green and Ian Shapiro's book, Pathologies of Rational Choice The­
ory. 35 Setting out to examine the public choice literature on its own 
terms, Green and Shapiro ask what that literature has revealed 
about politics, and conclude "that exceedingly little has been 
learned."36 Although admitting that intellectually elegant models 
had been created, they find little in the way of empirical payoff: a 
"large proportion of the theoretical conjectures of rational choice 
theorists have not been tested empirically," and "[t]hose tests that 
have been undertaken have either failed on their own terms or gar­
nered theoretical support for propositions that, on reflection, can 
only be characterized as banal."37 In short, they vigorously disagree 
with Stearns's assessment that public choice offers "rich and falsifi­
able theses about collective decisionmaking" (p. xxii). 
34. For the contrary view about the desirability of term limits, see Einer Elhauge, Are 
Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83 {1997). See also Garrett, supra note 13, at 
639 (critiquing the Cohen and Spitzer model but concluding for other reasons that term limits 
will not decrease the power of special interests). 
35. GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 4. 
36. Id. at x. 
37. Id. at 6. 
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In their survey of the empirical evidence, Green and Shapiro 
cover a broad range of topics: the voter's paradox, prisoner's di­
lemmas and free-riding, legislative behavior, and spatial theories of 
electoral competition. They accuse public choice researchers of a 
number of methodological pathologies, including (1) developing 
models to fit the data, rather than testing models by making predic­
tions, (2) failing to test competing explanations, (3) making vague 
or ambiguous predictions that cannot readily be falsified, and ( 4) 
mining the historical record for confirming data. 38 
Green and Shapiro's analysis of the voter's paradox is illustra­
tive. As we saw in Part I, one possible explanation for voting is that 
the act itself is gratifying - that is, has consumption value. Green 
and Shapiro point out, however, that no one has offered indepen­
dent evidence of this consumption value apart from voter turnout 
itself - the fact to be explained. They also observe that it seems 
peculiar that people do not obtain equal consumption value from 
other actions such as jury service or writing letters to legislators. 
An equally unproven explanation is that political leaders are aware 
of who votes and offer selective incentives to individual voters. Or, 
perhaps voters have inflated estimates of the likelihood of casting 
the tie-breaking vote, though no evidence of such a cognitive error 
. has been produced.39 More recent efforts to resolve the voter's par­
adox involve game theory. In some game theory models, "voters 
simultaneously decide whether to vote based on their strategic an­
ticipation of others' actions [producing] an equilibrium result in 
which many people tum[ ] out."40 The problem is that the results 
depend entirely on the assumption that voters are perfectly in­
formed about the voting costs of other citizens and about the exact 
level of support of the candidates.41 Turnout disappears with more 
realistic assumptions about voters. Nor are Green and Shapiro im­
pressed by the argument that voting is a uniquely low-cost activity 
that consequently offers an unusual chance to express ideological 
preferences: "Can it be said of Latin America� elections, in which 
voters spend hours in polling lines, sometimes amid threats of vio­
lence, that turnout is a low-cost activity? What of the more than 
100,000 African-Americans who persevered through the intimida­
tion and poll taxes of the Jim Crow South and voted in the national 
elections of the 1950s?"42 Finally, they consider the fall-back as­
sumption that, while public choice cannot explain the existence of 
high turnout, it can explain marginal variations in turnout relating 
38. See id. at 33-46. 
39. See id. at 51-56. 
40. Id. at 57. 
41. See id. at 57-58. 
42. Id. at 58-59. 
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to the closeness of the election or the costs of voting - for exam­
ple, bad weather. They find the theory's empirical predictions 
about these marginal effects to be either banal or unconfirmed.43 
In sum, Green and Shapiro conclude, "[r]eaders interested in 
the determinants of voter turnout . . .  will derive little insight from 
the empirical work in the rational choice tradition."44 It is difficult, 
they contend, to see how rational choice theory could be discon­
firmed given the range of maneuvers open to account for the data, 
including "post hoc insertion of idiosyncratic tastes, beliefs, and 
probability assessments as explanatory devices."45 Nor do they find 
the voter's paradox to be an isolated failure of public choice theory. 
They find similar failings in the literature on the related problem of 
free riding and collective action, a problem that is basic to the Chi­
cago School's prediction of undue influence by concentrated special 
interests.46 
Given Stearns's stress on problems of cycling, it is also worth 
considering Green and Shapiro's empirical evidence on the subject. 
They begin by deconstructing purported historical examples of cy­
cling offered by William Riker and others.47 Green and Shapiro 
find little empirical evidence on the question of whether institu­
tional arrangements affect instability,48 nor even testable predic­
tions on this question.49 Perhaps most tellingly, they find that the 
experimental evidence fails to confirm clearly a central prediction 
of voting theory: that outcomes should be found in the "core" 
when one exists.50 Moreover, seemingly extraneous factors, like 
perceptions of fairness, differences in the gaming talents of the par­
ticipants, and cognitive difficulties, seem to affect outcomes heav­
ily. 51 Indeed, the dispersion of outcomes seems to be only a little 
larger in games without a core, where cycling should be rampant.52 
None of these findings, of course, disprove Arrow's Theorem; by 
definition, mathematical theorems cannot be falsified empirically. 
What is unclear is whether Arrow's Theorem and its successors lead 
to useful falsifiable predictions about how actual legislatures be­
have under varying conditions. 
43. See id. at 59-68. 
44. Id. at 68. 
45. Id. at 69. 
46. See id. at 72-97. 
47. See id. at 109-11. 
48. See id. at 113. 
49. See id. at 117-19. 
50. See id. at 127-28. 
51. See id. at 129-31. 
52. See id. at 135. 
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Green and Shapiro's conclusion, in a nutshell, is that public 
choice has failed to produce usable empirical knowledge. They find 
little payoff in terms of understanding actual political behavior. 
They call upon public choice theorists "to get closer to the data so 
as to theorize in empirically pertinent ways," and to open their eyes 
to competing hypotheses about human behavior stemming from so­
cial sciences other than economics. 53 
Although Stearns does not cite Pathologies of Rational Choice 
Theory, leading researchers in the field have taken the book seri­
ously. Public choice theorists were quick to respond to the accusa­
tion that they had failed to live up to their own methodological 
standards that required scientific theories to deduce falsifiable pre­
dictions subject to rigorous statistical testing. Perhaps the most in­
teresting feature of the responses is the extent to which leading 
public choice scholars themselves rejected these "scientific" aspira­
tions in favor of a more humanistic approach.54 Consider the views 
of three leading public choice scholars: John Ferejohn, Morris 
Fiorina, and Ken Shepsle. 
Ferejohn, in an essay coauthored with Debra Satz,55 argues that 
Green and Shapiro's "conception of what constitutes a contribution 
to knowledge is too narrow; it excludes much good social sci­
ence."56 Specifically, the essay argues, social science theories serve 
other important purposes besides producing valid empirical predic­
tions. First, a good theory may make problematic previously unex­
amined phenomena - like voter turnout - creating a new 
research agenda. Second, a theory may unify apparently unrelated 
phenomena or shed light on deep structural similarities that might 
otherwise escape understanding.57 For example, pointing to studies 
of the reelection motive of legislators, the essay applauds the re­
search for demonstrating .the existence of an underlying causal 
mechanism for seemingly unrelated phenomena: ''Even if none of 
these studies had provided an improved statistical account of any 
specific behavioral phenomenon, they would remain outstanding 
additions to our understanding of congressional behavior and 
organization. "58 
Fiorina takes a similar position. He argues that the "notion of 
empirical research that 'contributes to our understanding of poli-
53. See id. at 203. 
54. For an overview, see Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: Economic Approaches to Poli­
tics, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNrROVERSY, supra note 4, at 1-24. 
55. John Ferejohn & Debra Satz, Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory, 
in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNrROVERSY, supra note 4, at 71. 
56. Id. at 72. 
57. See id. at 72-76. 
58. Id. at 76. 
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tics' is far more general than the idea of testing a specific theoretical 
proposition."59 For example, he says, "it boggles the mind that any­
one would deny the empirical contributions that resulted from the 
work of Mancur Olson."60 Olson's theory provided an explanation 
of a familiar phenomenon - the unequal representation of differ­
ent interest groups in the political process. In doing so, he sparked 
a new research agenda about why people join groups, and he pro­
vided the basis for imaginative accounts of larger-scale events like 
the periodic surges in congressional power. Thus, Fiorina says, we 
need a broader conception of what constitutes an empirical 
contribution: 
Every empirically based modification, generalization, or even re­
jection of Olson is an empirical contribution stimulated by his work. 
Every extension of his ideas to new areas is an empirical contribution. 
Every incorporation of his ideas in larger explanatory accounts is an 
empirical contribution. Even seeming counter-examples that lead 
people to see matters in a new light are empirical contributions.61 
Besides their overly demanding concept of empiricism, Fiorina 
says, Green and Shapiro also overlook several important aspects of 
public choice itself. First, public choice is a general perspective, not 
a unified theory, so there is a large diversity of scholarship embody­
ing many different models: "every manner of disagreement - the­
oretical, substantive, methodological - can be found" in public 
choice.62 Second, public choice is not intended as a monocausal ex­
planation. Instead, it is offered with an implicit "all other things 
being equal" clause. For example, Olson's work does not predict 
the absence of collective organizations, but merely that, all things 
being equal, larger, diffuse groups are more difficult to organize 
than small concentrated ones.63 Finally, no public choice model is 
intended as a comprehensive explanation of an institution. Instead, 
each offers a partial view focusing on significant features of the in­
stitution. As a result, "there will never be a single . . .  model of a 
real presidential campaign, of the U.S. Congress, or of the federal 
regulatory process. What we are engaged in is the construction of 
scores of models that focus on different aspects of political institu­
tions and processes."64 
Like Fiorina and Ferejohn, Shepsle faults Green and Shapiro for 
having too narrow a view of public choice and too restricted a con­
cept of valid research. Given the undeveloped nature of political 
59. Morris P. Florina, Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enter-
prise, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 90. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 91. 
62. Id. at 87. 
63. See id. at 88-89. 
64. Id. at 89. 
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science, he says, "a theory may remain a live prospect, even though 
it is not a very good theory, because it trumps alternatives" -
which, he adds, should be a source of modesty for public choice 
theorists.65 Moreover, one should be "charitable toward relatively 
soft assessments" of theories given the great difficulty of rigorous 
statistical testing.66 Finally, Shepsle says, Green and Shapiro under­
estimate the extent to which public choice scholars hav� responded 
constructively to criticism by incorporating cultural explanations 
into their models and generalizing their models to include human 
cognitive limitations.67 
The upshot of these responses is a significant modesty about the 
aspirations of public choice theory. A public choice model may 
give us insights into commonalities between different phenomena; it 
may suggest new avenues for empirical research; and it may provide 
insights into how particular aspects of institutions function. Public 
choice theory will not, however, give us a unified model of even a 
single major political institution that accounts for all aspects of its 
behavior, let alone a model ofthe political system as a whole. Nor 
will public choice allow us to evade a realistic appreciation of the 
complexities of human behavior, whether those complexities be­
come complications of the model itself, as Shepsle suggests, or serve 
instead as implicit, "all things being equal" conditions, as Fiorina 
suggests. In short, we can hope for insights from public choice the­
ory, but we are not going to get The Truth About Politics anytime 
soon. 
From the point of view of legal scholars, the ideal interdiscipli­
nary theory would have several characteristics. It would be simple 
- so that even law professors could use it. It would be unequivocal 
in its predictions - so we could easily use the predictions to evalu­
ate the consequences of legal rules. It would explain all or most 
human behavior within some clearly specified field of activity - so 
we would know when to apply it. Finally, it would produce verified 
but counterintuitive predictions - so that it would reveal some­
thing startling about legal rules. As is evident from the debate over 
Green and Shapiro's book, public .choice is not this dream theory. 
But that does not mean that it is useless from the point of view of 
legal scholars. Instead, it means that we must be more realistic in 
our expectations for interdisciplinary scholarship. As we will see, 
despite its shortcomings, public choice has been used to good effect 
to illuminate legal issues. 
65. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory, 
in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 217. 
66. See id. at 219. 
67. See id. at 220-21. 
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B. Fruitful Encounters Between Law and Public Choice 
Stearns lauds public choice for providing "a powerful set of ana­
lytic tools with which to evaluate the most pressing problems that 
face public policy makers, lawyers, bureaucrats, and judges" (p. xx­
iii). In light of the Pathologies debate, however, the reader may 
wonder whether public choice really does have anything useful to 
contribute to public la,w. We believe the answer is yes. In this sub­
section, we discuss three recent, and in our opinion, successful uses 
of public choice insights in public law scholarship. Our purpose is 
not merely to pass out plaudits, but to use these examples to ex­
plore the conditions under which public choice is likely to prove 
most useful in legal scholarship. 
Our first example is Jerry Mashaw's recent work on pre­
enforcement review of administrative regulations. 68 In the past few 
decades, rulemaking has played an increasingly central role in ad­
ministrative regulation, and courts have responded by allowing im­
mediate judicial review of regulations - without waiting for 
application of the regulation to specific situations. Today, there is 
considerable dissatisfaction about the "ossification" of the rulemak­
ing process, a problem that may be partly due at least to overzeal­
ous judicial review. As a result, agencies increasingly abandon 
rulemaking for other - often less desirable - regulatory tech­
niques. 69 Mashaw suggests that we might usefully restructure judi­
cial review to decrease the incentive for private interests to exploit 
judicial review as a form of obstruction. 
Specifically, Mashaw argues that limiting pre-enforcement judi­
cial review would dramatically improve the incentives of private 
parties. To explore this possibility, he uses simple game theory 
models, working through two pre-enforcement review games and 
one who-will-sue game.70 These models demonstrate that a firm 
will almost always bring pre-enforcement suit if there is no penalty 
for noncompliance with the regulation during the litigation. If 
there is a penalty for noncompliance, the game becomes more com­
plicated, because it becomes likely that some firms will comply 
rather than sue. This successful compliance may increase the likeli­
hood that a court will uphold the regulation - and hence the likeli­
hood of a penalty against noncompliers. Challenges to regulations 
do not disappear, but the likelihood of challenges becomes sensitive 
to parameters such as the probability of success. 
At least in some settings, Mashaw suggests, shifting the timing 
of review would have valuable consequences. It would push regu-
68. MAsHAw, supra note 1, at 158-80. 
69. See id. at 158-66. 
70. See id. at 167-74. 
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lated parties toward devoting their energies to a good-faith effort to 
comply rather than toward elaborating arguments about the impos­
sibility of compliance. It would make judicial review more realistic, 
because review could be based not only on the record before the 
agency but on evidence about the real-world implementation of the 
regulation. It would eliminate unnecessary judicial review where 
compliance costs tum out to be lower than expected by industry. 
But Mashaw does not offer pre-enforcement review as a panacea. 
He concedes that pre-enforcement review may be suitable where 
the need for legal certainty is especially high - for example, when 
environmental · regulations require complex interactions between 
different levels of government.71 
Our purpose here is not to endorse Mashaw's proposal,72 but 
rather to highlight his fruitful use of game theory. The decision of 
one firm to sue depends on the strategic decisions of other firms, 
and game theory is designed to clarify just such complex interac­
tions. But Mashaw wisely does not place sole reliance on his mod­
els. Instead he draws on his own learning as an expert on 
administrative law to assess the significance of the conclusions. 
Thus, he melds his legal expertise with public choice techniques. 
Our second example also deals with interactions between courts 
and agencies. In a substantial body of work culminating in a recent 
book,73 Bill Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation by courts 
inevitably involves value judgments that evolve_ over time. For this 
reason, he conceptualizes courts as participants in a dynamic inter­
action with agencies and Congress, rather than being aloof from the 
rest of the governance system. Eskridge makes apt use of public 
choice models to assess the way in which the Chevron doctrine74 
affects interactions between the branches of government. He mod­
els statutory interpretation as a sequential game involving median 
legislators in both houses, the President, agencies, and the courts. 
His analysis suggests two conclusions. One conclusion is rather ba­
nal: the Chevron doctrine increases presidential power to shift pol­
icy over time (pp. 190-93). The other conclusion, however, is more 
intriguing. The models suggest that ·"even if judicial preferences 
about statutory policy were completely unrelated to legislative pref-
71. See id. at 174-80. 
72. For criticisms, see Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Re­
view: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 
Omo ST. L.J. 85 {1997); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the 
Contemporary Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1746 {1998) (reviewing MAsHAw, supra 
note 1). 
73. WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION {1994). 
74. The Chevron doctrine, named after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De­
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837 {1984), requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpreta­
tions of statutes. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 161-64. 
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erences aggressive judicial review would not necessarily be 
countermajoritarian because it would create a new default position 
relatively less influenced by presidential preferences. "75 It is this 
capacity to produce novel insights that make public choice a poten­
tially useful tool. 
Our final example is drawn from the work of an economist, 
rather than a law professor. Interestingly enough, it is less oriented 
toward formal modeling and more toward empirical evidence than 
the last two examples. William Fischel provides an in-depth analy­
sis of takings law in his recent book, Regulatory Takings.76 One of 
his intriguing suggestions is that the application of takings law 
should be more stringent for local governments than for higher 
levels of government. His argument, which he only sketches, rests 
on the propensity of local governments to break their commit­
ments, because the long-term effects of such betrayals will fall upon 
future residents of the community, who often come from elsewhere, 
rather than the community's current residents and their descen­
dants.77 Competition between localities for residents and busi­
nesses mitigates this effect, but the restraining effect of competition 
fails to operate in some settings, particularly those involving the 
regulation of immobile capital. In contrast, higher levels of govern­
ment are more inclusive and less able to externalize costs on outsid­
ers. Although Fischel's argument is rooted in public choice theory, 
what makes it plausible is the body of empirical evidence, ranging 
from the anecdotal to the econometric, that Fischel presents about 
the tendency of local government to impose costs on outside own­
ers of fixed assets.1s 
We consider each of these examples to be a successful use of 
public choice theory in legal scholarship. Though one may well 
quarrel with each author's ultimate conclusions, each effectively 
uses public choice to expose a previously neglected dimension of a 
legal issue, whether it be the effect of timing rules on litigation 
against agencies, the relationship between judicial review and sub­
sequent legislative action, or the relevance of a jurisdiction's size to 
the propensity toward overregulation of land use. By highlighting 
some neglected structural aspect of a situation, each author pro-
75. EsKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 167. By countermajoritarian, Eskridge means that the 
outcome is farther away from the ideal points of the legislature, which means that the out­
come would be less likely to receive the sanction of the Article I lawmaking process. 
76. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PoLmcs 
{1995). 
77. See id. at 131-35. 
78. See id. at 289-324. One particularly striking example involves studies of rent control 
regulations for mobile homes in some California co=unities that prevent owners of mobile 
home parks from utilizing any "exit" options while leaving them at the prey of localities with 
high concentrations of tenants. Id. at 309-24. 
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vides a basis for an innovative modification of existing legal rules. 
Each author also shows a sensitivity to cross-cutting normative is­
sues - for example, the tension between our commitment to the 
democratic process and our desire to block special-interest legisla­
tion. None of the authors attempt to give the public choice findings 
more weight than they can reasonably carry. 
Notably, we think, each work is by an author with a deep, long­
standing immersion in both the field of law and the relevant public 
choice literature, not someone who has merely read a few Supreme 
Court cases and knows the term "rent-seeking." At least in the 
right hands, then, the tools of public choice theory can make a gen­
uine contribution to public law scholarship. 
These uses of public choice may be less ambitious than the 
fondest hopes of some of its early advocates in legal scholarship. 
But these applications of public choice are consistent with the more 
modest aspirations expressed in responses to Green and Shapiro. 
As we saw, Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Shepsle praised public choice 
more for its ability to offer illuminating explanations of particular 
phenomena than as a source of certainty about governmental func­
tioning, while admitting that - at least as yet - its predictive pow­
ers are limited. The legal scholarship discussed in this subsection 
harmonizes with the views expressed by Peter Ordeshook, another 
prominent public choice scholar, in the Pathologies debate: 
Thus, rather than approach the construction ,and assessment of 
models as though we were scientists discovering basic laws of the uni­
verse, we should try to solve specific problems in specific contexts 
with an understanding that different models may be best suited for 
different situations. Every bridge is a special problem in engineering. 
We also need to appreciate that certain aspects of reality cannot yet 
be subjected to abstract theoretical analysis, or even to fully coherent 
empirical analysis. Crude rules of thumb, intuition based on experi­
ence, simple insight, and "mindless statistical analysis" will be an es­
sential part of our enterprise.79 
We leave it to political scientists to decide whether Ordeshook's 
advice is suitable for their discipline, but we have little doubt that 
his views about the uses of public choice are entirely on target with 
respect to legal scholars. 
III: PUBLIC CHOICE IN THE CLASSROOM 
One implication of our discussion is that public choice has influ­
enced legal scholarship in some important ways and, if applied with 
appropriate modesty, may have even more significant influence in 
the future. As in at least the early days of law and economics, how-
79. Peter Ordeshook, Engineering or Science: What is the Study of Politics?, in THE RA­
TIONAL CHOICE CoNTROVERSY, supra note 4, at 187. 
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ever, it is much more daunting to analyze how public choice can be 
domesticated for the law school classroom. It may be a hit in the 
glitzy Broadway of the faculty lounge, but how will it play in the 
Peoria heartland of the classroom? 
Few law professors have developed sophistication with public 
choice. Those who have may find Steams's book an excellent vehi­
cle for teaching a seminar or course devoted to the subject. 
Levmore, for example, reports that he used portions of the book in 
manuscript form and found much student enthusiasm for the mater­
ials (p. xiii). Even sophisticates, however, may face some structural 
difficulties. Unlike Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law80 
and, to a lesser extent, Mitchell Polinsky's An Introduction to Law 
and Economics, 81 Steams's book is constituted largely of lengthy 
excerpts of law review articles, with numerous questions and com­
ments interspersed. Both the Posner and Polinsky books are in 
monograph form, eschewing reprinting the work of others. Accord­
ingly, as the products of one mind and organizational structure, 
they provide a more integrated and overarching look at their sub­
ject. In our experience pondering the presentation of law-and­
materials to students, books of the Posner-Polinsky format tend to 
lend themselves more easily to classroom use. We have not taught 
out of Stearns's book, however, and in any event have no desire to 
belabor this matter of pedagogical taste. 
We doubt that we have much useful pedagogical advice to offer 
to sophisticates who have dedicated at least some of their scholarly 
agenda to the relationship of public law and public choice. Obvi­
ously, these professors are well equipped to take on Stearns's book 
as teachers and follow Levmore's advice that public law and public 
choice should be offered as a methodological course, much like law 
and economics, feminist legal theory, and so on (pp. xiv-xv). Will 
such methodological courses supplant traditional substantive 
courses? For the moment, we doubt that a revolution in the law 
school curriculum along these lines is about to happen. Frankly, we 
also doubt that, as yet, many law professors have come to share 
Levmore's judgment that "[t]he most exciting intellectual develop­
ment in law schools in the last decade is surely the arrival and 
growth of public choice theory" (p. xi). 
The much more daunting question is what the professor who 
finds public choice analysis helpful in analyzing public law should 
do in the classroom, if she is unable or unwilling to offer a course or 
seminar dedicated solely to the relationship of public law and public 
choice. The obvious alternative to the focused, methodological ap­
proach is what Levmore himself calls the "trans-substantive" ap-
80. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992). 
81. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN !Nrn.ODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989). 
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proach, in which an area of law is enriched by interdisciplinary 
analysis (p. xv). Our preference for this undertaking is exemplified 
by the two casebooks we have edited, which both attempt to weave 
public choice analysis into various topics of public law that are at 
the core of the fields the books cover.82 But even in situations in 
which a teacher of public law is using a casebook that provides no 
linkage to public choice, she has a rich array of articles - many of 
them excerpted by Stearns - from which to pick and choose illus­
trations in which public choice provides useful analysis.83 
For example, when one of us taught a basic course in statutory 
civil rights a few years ago, using a casebook that did not mention 
public choice analysis, he found it helpful to illuminate the Supreme 
Court's shifting approaches to the interpretation of these statutes 
through public choice analysis. That was not a difficult task: Bill 
Eskridge had published an article that provided a roadmap for ana­
lyzing these jurisprudential meanderings through straightforward, 
easily understood public choice analysis - the sort of thing that 
lends itself to intuitive diagrams on the blackboard.84 The teacher 
never assigned the article to the students, but instead did a bit of 
the rabbit-out-of-the-hat act the first time the topic seemed logi­
cally to present itself in class. The students were fascinated by it 
and themselves returned to that analysis at later points, often with­
out the need for any suggestive questions from the podium. This 
approach worked well because the insights were intuitive, required 
no sophisticated mathematics or modeling, and were of general in­
terest to students because they provided a sharper window on basic 
lawyerly questions, such as the extent to which the Supreme Court 
has demonstrated the apparent capacity to engage in strategic statu­
tory interpretation and the factors that would seemingly influence 
the exercise of strategic discretion. 
Similarly, in teaching environmental law, one of us has found it 
useful to introduce the Chicago School model of interest group in­
fluence. Environmental law seemingly serves the diffuse social in­
terest in environmental quality at the expense of concentrated 
industry interests. It thus presents something of a puzzle for the 
Chicago School. Bringing in the Chicago School model serves two 
purposes. First, it invites students to consider the ways in which 
82. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITU­
TION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PmLIP P. FruCKEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUI'ES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
(2d ed. 1995). We organized and presented the materials in a way that, we hope, allows the 
professor who does not desire to present public choice analysis simply to skip over it. 
83. Ironically, the success of Steams's book in the economic marketplace is endangered 
by this "free riding," in which his book serves as a sort of teacher's manual for those teaching 
public law. 
84. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/Presi­
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. .REv. 613 (1991). 
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special interests may have succeeded in reshaping environmental 
legislation to serve better their own interests.85 Second, it raises the 
question of how our society has managed to overcome the transac­
tion costs and free-rider barriers to environmental legislation. Part 
of the answer may be the role played by environmental groups in 
the process of creating and implementing environmental law.86 An 
appreciation of the role of these groups can improve students' un­
derstanding of the dynamics of environmental law. 
Our guess is that this episodic approach is the most frequent 
scenario by which public choice is making its way into the class­
room. To be sure, it is a somewhat intellectually impoverished 
pedagogy when compared to a class dedicated to public choice. But 
if done carefully, it broadens the intellectual content of the law 
school classroom in a way that demonstrates to students a meaning­
ful linkage between the practice of law and interdisciplinary in­
sights. Unfortunately, the messages law students receive about law­
and- analysis are often not the ones professors are attempting to 
send. A class dedicated to law-and- analysis threatens to suggest to 
law students that the professor is grudgingly employed in a profes­
sional school while attempting to replicate graduate-school curricu­
lar offerings that have no obvious utility to the practicing bar. 
Much the same problem arises from poorly integrated law-and- in­
sertions into traditional courses: the message is something like, "we 
will now spend ten minutes on something intellectually interesting, 
unlike our basic casebook material, and unlike what lawyers really 
do for a living." 
The trans-substantive approach provides a number of ways to 
combat this problem. For example, one of us introduces many of 
the topics in the Legislation course through the use of a case study 
of the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,87 followed by an 
examination of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 88 a well-known case 
addressing whether Title VII of the Act forbids voluntary affirma­
tive action in private employment.89 One lesson extracted from 
Weber is that there are at least three potential perspect.ives to give 
meaning to a statute - the textual perspective, focusing on statu­
tory language; the institutional perspective, focusing on the legisla­
ture in general and the legislative history of the statute in particular; 
and the contextual perspective, focusing on the factual and legal 
85. The classic discussion of this phenomenon is BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. 
HAssLER, CLEAN CoAiiDIRTY AIR (1981). 
86. For further exploration of these issues, see Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure 
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 59, 59-61, 65-72 (1992). 
87. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
88. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
89. See EsKRIDGE & FruCKBY, supra note 82, at 1-34, 71-87. 
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situation in which the parties find themselves years after the statute 
was drafted and enacted. The instructor then has the class examine 
materials presenting three models ·of the legislative process - one 
focusing on problems of rational choice, such as Arrow problems; 
another examining interest group formation and activity, including 
free-rider problems; and a third assessing the deliberative capacities 
of the legislative process.90 The first two models seemingly under­
cut the attractiveness of focusing on the institutional perspective in 
interpreting statutes� · The legislature ends up looking like an insti­
tution capable of reaching majoritarian decisions that are arbitrary 
for Arrovian reasons and lack any coherent underlying purpose. To 
the extent that any organizing intent lies behind a statute, more­
over, the interest group transactional model posits that it merely 
reflects a systematic skewing .of political power in favor of small, 
well-organized interests. The third - deliberative - model is 
more normatively attractive, but strikes many students as descrip­
tively implausible. 
· This conversation is designed to debunk the institutional per­
spective on giving meaning to statutes. At that point, the instructor 
then briefly has the class debunk the other two perspectives as well. 
Students are usually able to bring something from their undergrad­
uate liberal-arts education of assistance here. For example, the no­
tion of plain textual meaning is subject to a variety of objections, 
such as deconstruction theory, the theory that textual autonomy 
cannot be divorced from authorial intent, and the notion that tex­
tual meaning requires an understanding of the interpretive commu­
nity engaged in assessing it. Similarly, the notion that judges can 
achieve pragmatic contextual outcomes is challenged · by studies 
measuring the impact of judicial decisions and by basic law-and­
economics analysis of the inefficiency of some areas of the law. 
One major goal of the exercise is to demonstrate that learning from 
allied fields is, indeed, relevant to the practice of law, when legal 
practice is understood as induding an important component of for­
mulating arguments in an ongoing dialogue within a professional 
community where interpretive theory remains essentially contested. 
In a Legislation course that focused not only on statutory inter­
pretation but on structural issues such as term limits and on process 
issues such as campaign finance reforms, an even stronger case can 
be made for introducing public choice theory at the beginning of 
the course. Once the theory has been explored in some depth, the 
teacher can return to the public choice models throughout the 
course when confronting, for example, regulation of lobbying, 
single-subject rules, the appropriations process, and so on. Simi­
larly, a constituti9nal law course that focused on the structural is-
90. See id. at 44-61. 
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sues of federalism and separation of powers might benefit from the 
conceptual framework provided by public choice theory. 
There are surely a variety of ways in which teaching materials 
. might attempt to overcome the difficulties of presenting law-and­
materials so that students appreciate their relevance. Stearns has 
made a noble effort to overcome these difficulties. His book fo­
cuses on a number of topics of obvious significance even to lawyers 
who narrowly conceive their professional purview - the legislative 
veto, the nondelegation doctrine, statutory interpretation, stare de­
cisis, constitutional structure, and so on. Furthermore, his ques­
tions often attempt to push students toward the integration of 
insights gleaned from public choice into legal doctrine. Only time 
will tell whether his methodological structure, or our trans­
substantive and sometimes episodic preferences, will prevail in the 
curricular marketplace. Similarly, it remains to be seen whether 
public choice scholarship will take the pragmatic route we 
recommend. 
We believe that public choice does have something to contribute 
to law schools. Both in terms of teaching and scholarship, public 
choice may turn out to function in several different ways. It may 
penetrate legal analysis only superficially, by contributing a few ba­
sic concepts about interest group influence or vote cycling, which 
legal academics can then invoke in their scholarship and pass on to 
their students, probably using the episodic approach. But this ap­
proach misses the opportunity to take advantage of the rich and 
sophisticated work now being done by political scientists in the pub­
lic choice mode.91 Another possibility is that legal scholars will 
merely translate the findings of political scientists into recommen­
dations for legal reform, using methodological courses to teach stu­
dents how to "apply" public choice results to legal issues. Though 
better than the first approach, we believe that this approach to 
teaching and scholarship suffers from the opposite weakness, be­
cause it limits the opportunities for legal academics to bring their 
own expertise to bear on problems. In our opinion, the best, 
although most difficult approach, is to try to integrate a fairly so­
phisticated understanding of public choice with a nuanced apprecia­
tion of the dynamics of the legal process. In the classroom, this 
approach lends itself to trans-substantive use of public choice 
materials; in scholarship, to a fruitful pragmatic melding of public 
choice and legal analysis.92 But regardless of whether the reader 
shares our view about the best approach to this kind of interdiscipli-
91. We highly recommend PERSPECTIVES ON Punuc CHOICE, supra note 6, as an accessi­
ble but sophisticated survey of this body of learning. 
92. The kind of work we have in mind is exemplified by the scholarship discussed supra in 
section 11.B. 
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nary venture, the Steams book will provide a valuable introduction 
to efforts to apply public choice to public law. 
